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NOTES
Tort Immunity of Charities in Ohio
WHETHER, OR TO what extent, private charitable institutions shall be
immune from liability for damages arising from the commission of torts by
their employees, solely because such institutions are organized for charitable
purposes, is a problem which has been the subject of considerable litigation
in the United States in the past fifty years.' The problem has not yet been
fully resolved, despite the unanimity of the text writers on the subject.2
To attempt to reconcile the decisions in the United States would be
futile; the courts in the various jurisdictions have reached diametrically op-
posite conclusions upon similar facts. Justice Rutledge, after analyzing the
cases involving the immunity of charitable institutions, said:
The cases are almost riotous with dissent. Reasons are even more
varied than results. They indicate something wrong at the beginning or
'Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951); Perry v. House
of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1885); McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120
Mass. 432 (1876); Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N.Y. 163,
7 N.E.2d 28 (1937); Rudy v. Lakeside Hospital, 115 Ohio St. 539, 155 N.E. 126
(1926); Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 Atil. 1087 (1910). See
also cases collected in Note, 25 A.LR.2d 29 (1952).
'The text writers have demonstrated the logical bareness of refusing to apply the
same rules of tort liability to both charitable and non-charitable institutions. The
logical basis of the doctrine will, therefore, not be labored here. See 2A BOGERT,
TRUSTS AND TRusmus § 401 (1953); PROSSER, TORTS 1079 et. seq. (1949); 3
SCOTT, TRUSTS § 402 (1939); Comment, 14 U. OF DETRoIT L.J. 74 (1951); 49
MICH. L. REV. 148 (1950); 13 OHIO ST. L.J. 291 (1952).
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that something has become wrong since then. They also show that cor-
rection, though in process, is incomplete....'
It is the purpose of the writer to analyze the present Ohio position re-
garding the vicarious liability of private charitable institutions in the light
of modern tendencies in other jurisdictions to abandon the rule granting
full immunity to charitable organizations and to predict, in some small
measure, the effect of the trend in other states upon future decisions in Ohio,
In view of the fact that the American judicial system is the only one which
recognizes the "immunity" rule,4 and that all other systems of jurisprudence
have either never distinguished between charities and non-charities with
regard to tort liability, or have expressly repudiated such distinctions,5 it is
not surprising to note that the immunity rule - a historical curiosity-
arose as a result of a judicial accident.
The immunity rule originated in England in 1846 by way of a dictum
in Heriot's Hospital v. Ross,8 a case involving a wrongful exdusion of the
plaintiff from the benefits of the defendant, a charitable institution. Lord
Cottenham, in dismissing the action, said:
To give damages out of a trust fund would not be to apply it to those
objects whom the author of the fund had in view, but would be to divert
it to a completely different purpose..
This dictum was repudiated in England shortly thereafter."
The first case in the United States which considered the problem adopted
the dictum in the Heriot's Hospital case and formulated it into a rule de-
daring charities to be immune from vicarious tort liability. In McDonad
v. Massachusetts General Hospital,' the court held that a charity patient's
'Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
'It should be noted that the word "immunity" as used here and by the courts means
exemption from the application of general rules of tort, which, but for the charitable
nature of the defendant organization, would apply. It does not mean an immunity
arising from the application of general tort rules. Thus, it would be quite consistent
for a court which had abandoned the immunity rule to direct a verdict for the de-
fendant institution on the basis of general tort rules applicable to both charities and
non-charities, e.g., that the tortfeasor was acting outside the scope of his employ-
ment.
'Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, 11 H.L Cas. 686, 11 Eng. Rep. 1500 (1866); Foreman
v. Mayor of Canterbury, L.R. 6 Q.B. 214 (1871); see Georgetown College v. Hughes,
130 F.2d 810, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Bond v. Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 404, 411, 84
A.2d 328, 332 (1951) (dissenting opinion); see Note, 25 A.LR.2d 29, 43 (1952).
'12 Clark &.T. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846).
S12 Clark & F. 507, 513, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508, 1511 (1846).
"Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, 11 H.L. Cas. 686, 11 Eng. Rep. 1500 (1866); Foreman.
v. Mayor of Canterbury, LR. 6 Q.B. 214 (1871).
' 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
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claim for damages could not be satisfied against the funds of a private
charitable hospital.10
Shortly thereafter, other states adopted the immunity rule as laid down
in the McDonald case, but the reasons for so doing were many and varied.
Some courts have adopted the immunity rule on the basis of what is known
as the "trust fund" theory - that the funds of a charity cannot be diverted
for the payment of tort claims because such funds are held in trust for the
accomplishment of a particular charitable purpose." Some of the decisions
upholding the immunity of charitable institutions have been premised on
the theory that the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to
charitable enterprises because the charity does not realize a profit from the
services of its employees.' 2 Still other cases have adopted the immunity
rule on the basis of an "implied waiver" theory - that a beneficiary of a
charitable institution waives any tort claims he may have against it by his
acceptance of the benefits or services of the institution.'3 A fourth group
"The court relied upon the early English cases of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12
Clark & F. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846) and Holliday v. St. Leonard, 11 C.B.N.S.
192, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861), both of which had been expressly overruled in
England prior to this decision. It should further be pointed out that, had these
decisions not been overruled in England, they would not have been good precedent
for use in the McDonald case in any event, since the Ross case dealt with a breach
of trust, and did not consider tort liability of charities at all, and the Holliday case
dealt only with the liability of a government-operated charitable institution.
"Ettlinger v. Randolph-Macon College, 31 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1929); Union Pa-
cific Ry. v. Artist, 60 Fed. 365 (8th Cit. 1894); Arkansas Valley Co-op. Rural
Electric Co. v. Elkins, 200 Ark. 883, 141 S.W.2d 538 (1940); Emery v. Jewish
Hospital Ass'n, 193 Ky. 400, 236 S.W. 577 (1921); Downes v. Harper Hospital,
101 Mich. 555, 60 N.W. 42 (1894); Jones v. St. Mary's Roman Catholic Church,
7 N.J. 533, 82 A.2d 187 (1951). The trust fund theory of immunity has been
rejected in some jurisdictions on the basis that the quasi-trust which arises as to
funds of charitable institutions does not differ materially from the obligation im-
posed upon any non-charitable business enterprise to apply its property only to the
purposes for which it was organized. Cohen v. General Hospital Soc'y, 113 Conn.
188, 154 At. 435 (1931); Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, 83 A.2d 753 (Del.
Super. 1951).
Hears v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 Ad. 595 (1895); Taylor, Adm'r
v. Protestant Hospital Ass'n, 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N.E. 1089 (1911); Fire Ins. Patrol
v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624, 15 Ad. 553 (1888); Schau v. Morgan, 241 Wis. 334, 6
N.W.2d 212 (1942). This legal theory has been attacked as invalid since the con-
cept of respondeat superior is predicated upon the authority and control which the
master exercises over his servants, not upon whether the master realizes a profit there-
from. Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344 (1940);
Gable v. Salvation Army, 186 Okla. 687, 100 P.2d 244 (1940); see Bachman v.
Y.W.C.A., 179 Wis. 178, 183, 191 N.W. 751, 755 (1922) (dissenting opinion).
'Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (1st Cir. 1901);
Murtha v. New York Homeopathic Medical College, 228 N.Y. 183, 126 N.E. 722
(1920); Sisters of Charity v. Duvelius, 123 Ohio St. 52, 173 N.E. 737 (1930);
Weston's Adm'x v. Hospital of St. Vincent, 131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785 (1921).
The implied waiver theory has been criticized as being an illusion in fact and a fic-
(Summer
NOTES
of cases has recognized the immunity rule on the ground of public policy.'
It has been suggested that each of these theories upholding the im-
munity rule rests fundamentally upon public policy, and that the various
theories are distinct and separate only insofar as the courts have worked out
separate legal fictions by which to reach a desired result. 5 If this is true, it
is difficult to understand why the public policy of Kansas's should demand
complete immunity for its charitable institutions, while the public policy
of Minnesota 7 insists that charitable institutions be held accountable for
the torts of their employees in the same manner as are non-charitable enter-
prises.
The various jurisdictions in the United States are not cleanly split be-
tween full liability and complete immunity. Many of them have adopted
the general immunity rule with diverse and inconsistent modifications."8 A
study of the cases in Ohio which have considered the immunity problem will
be helpful, not only to those who are interested in the Ohio law alone, but
also as an example of case law in a state which stands somewhere between
the extremes of complete immunity and full liability.
tion in law, since there is no actual or intentional assumption of the risk of negli-
gence by the beneficiary of the charity in the typical situation. Georgetown Col-
lege v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Ray v. Tucson Medical Center,
72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951).
" Currier v. Dartmouth College, 117 Fed. 44 (1st Cir. 1902); Hinman v. Berkman,
85 F. Supp. 2 (D. Mo. 1949); Taylor, Adm'r v. Protestant Hospital Ass'n, 85 Ohio
St. 90, 96 N.E. 1089 (1911); Bond v. Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A.2d 328
(1951); Wilson v. Evangelical Lutheran Church, 202 Wis. 111, 230 N.W. 708
(1930). The public policy theory of sustaining the immunity rule has been re-
jected by some courts on the basis that modern public policy differs substantially
from that which existed at the origin of the immunity rule, and that the need for pro-
tecting charities from being submerged by tort claims has long since passed. Ray
v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951); Haynes v. Presby-
terian Hospital Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W.2d 151 (1950); Mississippi Baptist
Hospital v. Holmes, 55 So.2d 142 (Miss. 1951), affl'd, 56 So.2d 769 (Miss. 1952).
' Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Andrews v.
Y.M.C.A., 226 Iowa 374, 284 N.W. 186 (1939).
1 Leeper v. Salvation Army, 158 Kan. 396, 147 P.2d 702 (1944).
'
TSt. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 212 Minn. 558, 4 N.W.2d
637 (1942).
' O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n, 105 Col. 259, 96 P.2d 835
(1939) (recovery allowed against charity which had insurance for such purpose);
Cohen v. General Hospital Soc'y, 113 Conn. 88, 154 Ad. 435 (1931) (recovery
allowed by stranger, but not by a beneficiary of charity); Medical College v. Rush-
ing, 1 Ga. App. 468, 57 SE. 1083 (1907) (paying beneficiary can recover, where-
as a charity patient cannot); Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950)
(only non-trust assets can be levied upon to satisfy judgment in tort); Old Folks'
& Orphan Children's Home v. Roberts, 91 Ind. App. 533, 171 N.E. 10 (1930)
(recovery allowed where charity was negligent in selection or retention of employee
who caused the injury); Cowans v. North Carolina Baptist Hospitals, 197 N.C. 41,
147 S.E. 672 (1929) (recovery allowed by employee of charity).
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Although there had been two prior lower court decisions,1" the first
Ohio Supreme Court statement on the question appeared in 1911 in Taylor
v. Protestant Hospital Association,2" in which the court held that hospitals,
as charitable corporations, are immune from liability imposed by the doc-
trine of respondeat superior on the basis of public policy, a rule which was
subsequently applied to charitable institutions other than hospitals. 21 It
is clear that in Ohio the legal theory upon which the immunity rule rests is
public policy2 2 although trust fund theory language has been used in at
least one case.2 s
Several exceptions to the doctrine of immunity have been recognized
by Ohio courts.
It is dear that where the directors or trustees of the charitable institution
have been negligent in the selection or retention of the employee who was
responsible for the claimed injury the immunity rule does not apply.24 The
burden of showing a lack of due care in the selection or retention of such
employees is upon the plaintiff, however, and must be pleaded as an ele-
ment of his cause of action in order to make out a prima facie case.25
It is also well-settled in Ohio that where the plaintiff is a stranger, or
non-beneficiary of the defendant-charitable institution, the immunity rule
does not apply.28 The problem of when an individual is classed as a bene-
ficiary of a charity, however, is not dear; 27 but although the plaintiff is a
"Johnson v. Lawrence Hospital for Women, 12 Ohio Dec. 802 (Franklin Com.
P1. 1902); Conner v. Sisters of the Poor, 7 Ohio N.P. 514 (Cincinnati Super. Ct.
1900).
" 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N.E. 1089 (1911).
'Waddell v. Y.W.C.A., 133 Ohio St. 601, 15 N.E.2d 140 (1938).
"Newman v. Cleveland Museum of Natural History, 143 Ohio St. 369, 55 N.E.2d
575 (1944); Cullen v. Schmit, 139 Ohio St. 194, 39 NXE.2d 146 (1942); Waddell
v. Y.W.C.A., 133 Ohio St. 601, 15 NXE.2d 140 (1938); Sisters of Charity v.
Duvelius, 123 Ohio St. 52, 173 N.E. 737 (1930); Rudy v. Lakeside Hospital, 115
Ohio St. 539, 155 N.E. 126 (1926); Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home, 104 Ohio
St. 61, 135 N.E. 287 (1922); Taylor, Adm'r v. Protestant Hospital Ass'n, 85 Ohio
St. 90, 96 N.E. 1089 (1911).
"Lakeside Hospital v. Kovar, Adm'r 131 Ohio St. 333, 2 N.E.2d 857 (1936).
'Newman v. Cleveland Museum of Natural History, 143 Ohio St. 369, 55 N.E.2d
575 (1944); Waddell v. Y.W.C.A., 133 Ohio St. 601, 15 N.E.2d 140 (1938);
Lakeside Hospital v. Kovar, Adm'r 131 Ohio St. 333, 2 N.E.2d 857 (1936); Taylor
v. Flower Deaconess Home, 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N.E. 287 (1922); see Cullen v.
Schmit, 139 Ohio St. 194, 196, 39 N.E.2d 146, 147 (1942).
"Waddell v. Y.W.C.A., 133 Ohio St. 601, 15 N.E.2d 140 (1938); Lakeside Hos-
pital v. Kovar, Adm'r 131 Ohio St. 333, 2 N.E.2d 857 (1936).
"Cullen v. Schmit, 139 Ohio St. 194, 39 N.E.2d 146 (1942); Sisters of Charity
v. Duvelius, 123 Ohio St. 52, 173 N.E. 737 (1930); Lovich v. Salvation Army,
Inc., 81 Ohio App. 317, 75 N.E.2d 459 (1947); Esposito v. Stambaugh Auditorium
Ass'n, 49 Ohio L. Abs. 507, 77 N.E.2d 111 (1946); Pflugfelder v. Convent of the
Good Shepherd, 55 Ohio App. 158, 9 N.E.2d 4 (1936).
E.g., Esposito v. Stambaugh Auditorium Ass'n, Inc., 49 Ohio L. Abs. 507, 77
[Slimmer
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paying r.eipient of the charity, he comes within the rule that beneficiaries of
a charity cannot maintain an action in tort against the charitable institu-
tion.28
The question of whether a breach of a statutory duty as distinguished
from a common law duty, by a charitable institution imposes liability upon
it, not withstanding its characterstic immunity, has been raised but not
completely settled in Ohio. The supreme court has not yet decided the
question, and two court of appeals cases have reached opposing results. 29
Other attacks upon the doctrine have met with little success 0in Ohio.
The fact that the action is brought on a theory of implied contract or
warranty does not of itself render the immunity rule inapplicable, if the
action basically sounds in tort."0 Whether the charitable institution is in-
corporated or not apparently makes no difference.31 The rule applies
whether the action is predicated upon negligence or nuisance,32 and whether
the claim is for personal injuries or property damage. 3
The fact that the charitable institution carries liability insurance does
not affect its liability,34 but at least one case has stated by way of dictum that
where a charitable institution contributes to the Ohio Workmeds Com-
pensation Fund, an employee, although a beneficiary, may maintain an ac-
tion against the Industrial Commission.3 5
N.E.2d 111 (1946), (patron of an independent lessee of premises owned by charit-
able institution is a beneficiary of the charity); Sisters of Charity v. Duvelius, 123
Ohio St 52, 173 N.E. 737 (1930) (special nurse employed by private patient and
allowed access to defendant hospital is not a beneficiary of the charity); Newman
v. Cleveland Museum of Natural History, 143 Ohio St. 369, 55 N.E.2d 575 (1944)
(purchaser of ride on elephant at zoo operated by charitable institution is a bene-
ficiary of the charity); Burgie v. Muench, 65 Ohio App. 176, 29 N.E.2d 439 (1940)
(one who participates in an organization affiliated with a church, although not a
church member, is a beneficiary of its charity); City Hospital of Akron v. Lewis, 47
Ohio App. 465, 192 N.E. 140 (1934) (hospital patient is a beneficiary).
'Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home, 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N.E. 287 (1922).
' Lovich v. Salvation Army, Inc., 81 Ohio App. 317, 75 N.E.2d 459 (1947) (im-
munity rule applies to breach of pure food laws by charitable institution); Howard,
Adm'r v. Children's Hospital, 37 Ohio App. 144, 174 N.E. 166 (1930) (immunity
rule does not apply to breach of a statute imposing absolute liability upon one who
takes unlawful possession of the body of deceased person).
'Rudy v. Lakeside Hospital, 115 Ohio St 539, 155 N.E. 126 (1926) (implied
contract); Lovich v. Salvation Army, Inc., 81 Ohio App. 317, 75 N.E.2d 459
(1947) (breach of warranty).
'Winton Place Methodist Episcopal Church v. Splain, 16 Ohio App. 331 (1922).
32 Ibid.
'Rudy v. Lakeside Hospital, 115 Ohio St. 539, 155 N.E. 126 (1926).
EUEmrick v. Pennsylvania R.R. Y.M.C.A., 69 Ohio App. 353, 43 N.E.2d 733
(1942).
'Myers v. Elyria Memorial Hospital Co., 30 Ohio L. Abs. 674 (Ohio App. 1938).
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Most of the Ohio cases have not attempted to distinguish between torts
committed in the course of charitable and non-charitable activities," with
the possible exception of Peardstein v, A. M. McGregor Home, 37 a recent
court of appeals decision which indicated by way of dictum that a tort com-
mitted by a charitable institution in the course of a non-charitable activity
may be actionable.
It is, therefore, proper to dassify Ohio as a state which recognizes quali-
fied immunity of charitable institutions. Whether the qualifications which
have beehi adopted in Ohio are logically consistent is doubtful.38 That the
cases seem to have been decided more on the basis of precedent than reason
seems evident from some of the language used by the supreme court:
While [charitable] institutions should be encouraged ... this encour-
agement must not be carried to the point where injustice will be done to
others.... It is believed that the duty to exercise care to prevent injury to
strangers will result in the exercise of greater care to patients ....
The court has remained silent, however, on the issue of whether a duty to
exercise care to prevent injury to patients or other beneficiaries of charity
as well as to non-beneficiaries, would be an even greater deterrent to negli-
gence.
In order to understand more fully the position which Ohio has taken,
and to better evaluate possibilities for future decisions in this state, as well
as elsewhere, it is important to consider the present trend in other jurisdic-
tions toward the view that a charitable institution is not exempt from tort
liability solely because of its charitable purposes.
This trend toward stripping charitable institutions of their traditional
immunity is based almost entirely upon changing concepts of public
policy.40 With the gradual shift of emphasis from the protection of prop-
erty rights to the preservation of human values it is natural that in the area
" Cullen v. Schmit, 139 Ohio St. 194, 39 N.E.2d 146 (1942); Esposito v. Stam-
baugh Auditorium Ass'n, 49 Ohio L Abs. 507, 77 N.E.2d 111 (1946); Emrick v.
Pennsylvania R.R. Y.M.C.A., 69 Ohio App. 353, 43 N.E.2d 733 (1942).
'79 Ohio App. 526, 528, 73 N.E.2d 106, 107 (1947). The writer submits that
this case should not be lightly regarded, for if a charitable institution loses its im-
munity from tort liability in non-charitable activities a mortal blow is struck at the
doctrine itself, since any tortious act may be construed to be non-charitable by defi-
nition, i.e., a tortious act is per se non-charitable, and hence actionable.
' It would seem that serious questions could be raised as to the logic of a rule which
allows a stranger, but not an employee or beneficiary, to recover against a charitable
institution in the name of public policy.
"'Sisters of Charity v. Develius, 123 Ohio St. 52, 58, 173 N.E. 737, 740 (1930).
S"In response to what appeared good as a matter of public policy at an early date,
many of the courts have created an immunity, which, under all legal theories, is
basically unsound, and especially so when the reasons upon which it was founded
no longer exist . . .when the reason for the existence of a declared public policy
no longer obtains, the court should, without hesitation, declare that such policy no
[Slimmer
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of tort liability of charitable institutions the same tendency should manifest
itself. 1 To date, thirteen states and the District of Columbia have expressly
-repudiated the immunity rule and have imposed full liability upon charita-
ble and non-charitable institutions alike.0 2 Whether other jurisdictions
which presently recognize the immuiity rule will follow the lead of these
states remains to be seen.
What course will Ohio follow in future considerations of the im-
munity rule? A proper analysis of the various possibilities depends upon
the answers to three questions:
1. Can the immunity rule be circumvented within the bounds of
established Ohio decisions?
2. Have any social, economic or political changes intervened since
the establishment of the rule in Ohio which may be sufficient to change the
public policy of the jurisdiction?
3. What persuasive effect, if any, will the present trend toward full
liability in other jurisdictions have upon the Ohio courts?
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to reversal of the immunity rule in Ohio is
precedent. For more than fifty years the courts have repeatedly stated their
adherence to the immunity doctrine. It should be noted, however, that
longer exists. Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 55 So.2d 142, 152
(Miss. 1951).
"'During the past two decades both the Federal Congress and the legislatures of
practically all of the states have in various forms declared a public policy to exist
in this country that is diametrically opposed to that invoked ...to sustain theimmunity of charitable institutions. ... As examples, practically every state has
enacted a workmen's compensation law; occupational disease disability laws ... and
employment security acts .... In addition to these laws federal legislation has en-
compassed the entire field of welfare and social security." Ray v. Tucson Medical
Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 33, 230 P.2d 220, 229 (1951).
"Alabama: Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915);
Arizona: Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951), over-
ruling Southern Methodist Hospital v. Wilson, 51 Ariz. 424, 77 P.2d 458 (1938);
California' Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal.2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951); Delaware:
Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, 83 A.2d 753 (Del. Super. 1951); District of
Columbia: Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942);
Florida: Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344(1940); Iowa: Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W.2d
151 (1950), overruling Mikota v. Sisters of Mercy, 183 Iowa 1378, 168 N.W. 219
(1918); Minnesota: Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392,
175 N.W. 699 (1920); Mississippi: Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 55
So.2d 142 (Miss. 1951), overruling Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Moore, 156 Miss.
676, 126 So. 465 (1930); New Hampshire: Welch v. Frisbie Memorial Hospital,
90 N.H. 337, 9 A.2d 761 (1939); North Dakota: Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess
Hospital, 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W.2d 247 (1946), overruling Boetcher v. Budd, 61
N.D. 50, 237 N.W. 650 (1931); Rhode Island: Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital,
12 R.I. 411 (1879); Utah: Brigham Young University v. Lillywhite, 118 F.2d 836
(10th Cir. 1941); Vermont: Poster v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 70
A.2d 230 (1950).
1953]
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early in the development of the rule in Ohio, the supreme court pointed
out that the application of the doctrine should not be rigid, that inasmuch
as the doctrine is founded upon public policy, it should be changed to fit
the needs of a dynamic society when necessary.48  In addition, the lowei
court decision of Pearlstein v. A.M. McGregor Home presents a possible
means of attack upon the doctrine within the confines of precedent." Should
legislation, however, be required, as has been intimated by the supreme
court,45 in order to overthrow the Ohio case law a simple statute would
provide such effect.46
The changed social, economic and political conditions prevalent in Ohio,
as well as in other jurisdictions, have made it clear that public policy de-
mands the rejection of the immunity rule in its entirety. With the advent
of greater emphasis upon human values as opposed to property rights, the
increased insurance coverage available and the concentration of charitable
institutions into evergrowing economic units, the fear that charitable insti-
tutions could not survive if subjected to tort liability becomes an archaic
phobia as well as an unjust rule of law. The fact that charitable institutions
in states which recognize full liability of charities have been able to with-
stand the legal attacks upon them is pragmatic proof that the immunity
rule is a mere crutch which has become useless with the convalescence of
the patient.
Any prediction of the persuasive effect of opinions in other jurisdictions
'i"... [the immunity] doctrine ... had its origin in considerations of public pol-
icy. It doubtless will be in the future, as it always has been, developed, modified or
extended as the necessities of new social and economic conditions demand." Taylor
v. Flower Deaconess Home, 104 Ohio St. 61, 73, 135 N.E. 287, 297 (1922).
"See note 37 supra.
""We may well suggest.., that our legislature could, if it wished, change the law
[as to the tort liability of charitable institutions] established by this court. It has
not done so; it may not desire to do so." Lakeside Hospital v. Kovar, Adm'r, 131
Ohio St. 333, 343, 2 N.E.2d 857, 865 (1936). It is interesting to note that the
Ohio courts had no such qualms about invading the realm of the legislature when
the immunity rule was originally adopted in Ohio, in spite of the fact that the rule
is a distinct exception to the ordinary rules of tort liability.
'E.g., Charitable institutions operating in this state shall have no special immunity
from tort liability purely because of their charitable purposes, but shall be liable as,
and subject to the same rules of law as, business enterprises of a non-charitable nature.
"State v. Phillips, 85 Ohio St. 317, 97 N.E. 976 (1912); Leonardi v. Leonardi, 21
Ohio App. 110, 153 N.E. 93 (1925).
" Damm v. Elyria Lodge, 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 NE.2d 337 (1952), 4 WEST. RES.
L Rav. 83.
"Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952), 4 WEST. RES. L REv.
80.
'Cowgill, Adm'r v. Boock, Adm'r, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950); Minkin
v. Minkin, 336 Pa. 49, 7 A.2d 461 (1939).
' Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
[Slimmer
